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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Jackson Heights neighborhood of Queens, New York,
Guadalupe Perez and her husband are entrepreneurs.1 The couple
owns a party decoration store in which they invested their life
savings, and where they have worked every day to earn about
$29,000 a year, considered "very low" income in New York.2 When
the business suffered during the recent recession, the couple had
difficulty paying rent, but they were afraid of going to a bank.3
1 Shaila Dewan, Microcredit for Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2013), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/business/microcredit-for-americans.html.2Id
3I.
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Instead, they turned to Grameen America, the stateside sister
company of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.4 Grameen provided an
initial loan that helped them remain open, and additional loans
enabled them to expand.5
Tigist Reda owns Demera Ethiopian Restaurant in Uptown,
Chicago.6 She recently hosted Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel to
speak about the city's Microloan Institute in order to help introduce
small business owners to a pool of $700,000 for microloans.7 Even
with substantial equity in the restaurant, she struggled to secure
enough additional loan capital for renovations.8 The restaurant's
"good food and good location" were apparently not enough.9
Through loans provided by the Institute, Reda was able not only to
renovate the restaurant, but also to hire twelve new employees and
begin considering a second location.10
Kiva Microfunds is a non-profit organization with a mission
"to connect people through lending to alleviate poverty."" Its loan
model exploits a recent surge in the popularity of crowdfunding.
Through a web-based platform, anyone can lend a minimum of
twenty-five dollars to be packaged as a loan to individual
entrepreneurs and collectives around the world "without access to
traditional banking systems."12 More recently, however, Kiva has
diverted some of its attention to credit needs in different
metropolitan areas in the United States. For example, Kiva City
Louisville, one of nine other Kiva platforms in various U.S. cities, lists
local businesses requesting loans of up to $5,000 with no interest.13
4 Id.
6 Gregory Karp, Chicago has $700,000 Ready to Lend to Small Businesses, CHI.





1 About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
12 Id.
13 Branden Lammers, Louisville Officially a Kiva City, LOUISVILLE BUSINESS FIRST




Premal Shah, co-founder and president of Kiva, calls it "a movement
of lending local," just like "buying local and eating local."14
These examples emphasize the potential for positive social
impact from the adoption of alternative credit sources, sources that
include microfinance. This article considers the lack of legal certainty
in the United States' regulation of microfinance and suggests that it is
well advised for certain reforms to be implemented both to promote
microfinance and to ensure credit safety for these products.
Alongside a proliferation of for-profit entities engaged in an
inherently contradictory "humanitarian banking" business, it appears
that this uncertainty could be addressed via select conventions
employed abroad. Part II of this article provides an overview of
microfinance and its ambitions and Part III details certain provisions
of United States law that apply to, or serve as a basis for thinking
about microfinance. Finally, Part IV discusses select strategies
employed around the world in regulating the field and evaluates
both their potential for success and possible shortcomings if
implemented in the United States.
II. MICROFINANCE
Microfinance refers to the financial services industry that has
principally served communities and individuals in developing
nations that lack access to more mainstream financial services.15 The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) understands the
term to mean "the provision of financial services in limited amounts
to low-income persons and small, informal businesses."1 6 These
services typically include credit and deposit accounts. The BCBS also
notes that borrowers of these funds are "typically concentrated in a
limited geographic area, social segment or entrepreneurial
undertaking."17 These loans often come with high interest rates to
14 Id.
15 See Aaron Jones, Promotion of a Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in
Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187 (2006).
16 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MICROFINANCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (Bank For Int'l
Settlements 2010) [hereinafter BASEL], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs175.pdf.
17 Id. at 9.
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offset high administrative costs and to make up for the risk derived
from borrowers' questionable creditworthiness and lack of
collateral.18 Microfinance institutions (MFls) in developing regions
issue these loans with the understanding that borrowers should use
them to fund income-producing activities or small businesses. Many
of these MFI products are considered drivers of economic growth
that foster the development of a country's financial sector.19 Often,
they are the only way for certain communities (where formal
financial instruments are otherwise unavailable, inaccessible, or
prohibitively expensive) to acquire working capital for projects. Of
course, the intent is that individuals will use such credit for
productive endeavors rather than for personal consumption.20 Access
to credit means access to capital, in theory jumpstarting a
community, creating jobs, and increasing the community's economic
productivity. A number of studies show that economic growth is not
only correlated with financial intermediary development, but might
be caused by such development.21 Most of these studies look to the
development in the macro economies of developing nations, but
economically-neglected communities and populations without access
to traditional financial intermediaries in the United States benefit as
well. Alternative financial intermediaries such as MFls provide the
starting point, whereas legal reforms that "strengthen creditor rights,
contract enforcement, and accounting practices, can boost financial
intermediary development and accelerate economic growth."22 On
the debtor side, however, regulation is needed to ensure continued
growth and to prevent problems.
18 Id.
19 See Jones, supra note 15, at 192.
20 See Partha Ghosh et al., IMPACT OF POLICIES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MICRO
FINANCE SECTOR 21 (MicroSave 2015), available at
http://www.microsave.net/files/pdf/
ImpactofPolicies and Regulationson theMicrofinance_Sector.pdf.
21 See Ross Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and
Causes, 46 J. MONETARY ECON. 31, 63 (2000); see also John P. Caskey et al., The
Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States 3 (World Bank, Working Paper
No. 3835, 2006).
22 Levine et al., supra note 21, at 63.
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III. LEGAL REGIMES IN THE UNITED STATES
Microfinance is intended to address the population, which
not only includes those in developing nations, but also people like
Guadalupe and countless others in the United States who are
financially crippled from unequal access to credit. However, due to
its connotation of a tiny loan, many still label microfinance as an
exotic humanitarian instrument reserved for the third world.23 In
light of this, there is still a mere patchwork of law and regulation
surrounding this type of small loan lending, and the non-profit
organizations that mostly participate do not fall under the umbrella
of any specific regulatory agency.24 Beyond small business lending
requirements implemented by individual states and requirements for
non-profit tax accounting, it is largely unregulated.25
A. Funding the Everyday Hustler: The Community
Reinvestment Act and Subsequent Measures
Since 1977, several laws enacted in the United States have
recognized disparate access to credit and supported community
entrepreneurs. Together, they act as a foundation for the idea of small
loans in the United States. A series of legislation shows signs of
Congress's principled intentions, but poor execution. In passing the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), Congress aimed to
require regulated financial institutions to demonstrate that they
"serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they
are chartered to do business."26 This included "the need for credit
services as well as deposit services,"27 and "regulated financial
institutions" are defined as those with FDIC-insured deposits.28 But
23 Tanya Mannes, Federal Microloans Big With Small Businesses, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 21, 2010, at C1.
24 Bill Burrus, LESSONS AND TRENDS OF MICROCREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 14




26 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2013).
27 Id.
28 Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate's
2014 265
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the CRA has been criticized as lacking teeth with its "scant
directives" of encouragement.29 Critics also point out a practical
deficiency in that it lacked a basis for determining the particular
institutions selected to carry out its mandate of meeting credit
needs.3 0
Subsequent regulations passed during the Clinton
administration in 1995 reconciled some of the CRA's statutory
ambiguities.3 1 The regulations allowed for a particular bank to choose
between evaluations under a standard compliance test or developing
their own strategic tests as well as the criteria of activities to satisfy
the tests.3 2 Most importantly, the regulations not only incentivized
but required banks to invest in, lend to, and assist local organizations
called community development financial institutions (CDFIs).33
CDFIs remained outside of legislative attention until roughly
two decades after the CRA, when the Community Development
Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 was passed to
"promote economic revitalization and community development" by
providing "[government] investment in and assistance to community
development financial institutions."34 Under this Act, funds were
earmarked for CDFIs to distribute to "underserved communities."
Around the same time, Congress passed the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), acknowledging that the target population
for smaller loans to the "community" was mostly comprised of
minority borrowers.3 5 Implemented by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve in Regulation B,36 the ECOA makes it "unlawful for
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to
any aspect of a credit transaction" for reasons including race, color,
Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129,
131 (2000).
29 Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1431, 1432 (1994-1995).
30 Id. at 1442.
31 See Nellie R. Santiago et al., Turning David and Goliath into the Odd
Couple: How the New Community Reinvestment Act Promotes Community
Development Financial Institutions, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 571, 590-92 (1998).
32 Id.
3 3 Id.
34 12 U.S.C. § 4701 (2013).
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2013 & Supp. IV 1998).
36 12 C.F.R. § 202 (2014).
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religion, national origin, sex, martial status, age, or an applicant's
receipt of public assistance.37 But funds and their availability were
only a part of what borrowers required. A few years later, the
Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs (PRIME) Act of 1999
allocated federal funds for programs offering training, technical
assistance, and capacity-building to microenterprises.38
The foregoing legislative initiatives came alongside other
reforms designed to expand the scope of authorized bank powers,
reforms culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of
1999.39 The GLBA removed the division between commercial and
investment banking activities.40 In doing so, it opened the door for
banks to engage in numerous securities, insurance, and merchant
banking activities through affiliation, consolidation, and the use of
subsidiaries.41
B. Post-Crisis
Between 1990 and the early 2000s, small business owners
relied heavily on home equity lines of credit and business credit
cards to finance capital expenditures.42 But in the wake of the
financial crisis, the availability of both experienced a drastic decline,
due in part to tightened lending standards.43 Economic recovery
following the crisis yielded a substantial increase in credit extended
to small businesses in the United States between 2007 and 2014.
According to the Thomson Reuters/PayNet Small Business Lending
Index (SBLI), financing in amounts under $1 million experienced an
37 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2013).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 6902 (2013); SBA Administrator's authority created by 15 U.S.C.
§ 634(b)(6) (2013); see also 13 C.F.R. § 119 (2014) (implementing regulation for
the PRIME Act of 1999).
39 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified in 12 and 15 U.S.C. (2013)).
40 See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations
Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 170 (2008-
2009).
41 Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 39 at § 103.
42 Luz Gomez & Elaine L. Edgcomb, A Newly Crowded Marketplace: How For-
Profit Lenders Are Serving Microentrepreneurs, FIELD AT THE ASPEN INSTITUTE 2
(2011), available at http://fieldus.org/publications/ForProfitLenders.pdf.
43 Id.
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eleven percent jump in July 2014 alone.4 4 Part of this increase was
likely attributed to the current administration's impressive list of
bailout commitments, although its actual investments thankfully
came up short of the original figures. These amounts were as follows:
$700 billion to "systemically important institutions" under the
Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), $6.4 trillion from the Federal
Reserve to restore liquidity in the financial markets, and $1.2 trillion
to various federal stimulus programs designed to "save or create
jobs" and "jumpstart the economy."45 Most relevant to the purposes
of this article, the central legislation that enabled this $1.2 trillion
allocation was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA,
or the "stimulus"), which promised $400 million over two years to
CDFIs.46
However, the sub-$1 million category of small business
financings examined by the SBLI fails to consider the backbone of the
American economy, the smallest of small businesses. The category is
overly inclusive. The Census Bureau's latest report crams 97.7
percent of all private businesses in the United States under the "small
business" moniker.47 Eighty-five percent of all United States
businesses employ five or fewer employees.48 The "small," or more
appropriately, "micro," businesses receiving Grameen America's
unsecured loans borrowed modest amounts of $1,500 to $8,000,49
rather than amounts between $10,000 and $1 million. Though their
desired loans are small, borrowers' insufficient credit histories and
lack of collateral equates to presumably low lender confidence. This
means that many of these businesses fall outside of the scope of
44 Thomson Reuters/PayNet Small Business Lending Index (September 2014),
http://www.paynetonline.com/SmallBusinesslnsights/ThomsonReutersPayNetSmall
BusinessLendinglnde.aspx.
45 David Goldman, CNNMoney.com 's bailout tracker, CNN MONEY (Nov. 16,
2009), http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/.
46 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009).
47 G. Scott Thomas, Almost 98% of all businesses are classified as small businesses,
THE BusINEss JOURNALS (November 2, 2011),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/bizjoumals/ on-numbers/scott-thomas/2011/11/98-of-
all-businesses-are-small.html.
48 Where We Work: United States, ACCION,
http://www.accion.org/page.aspx?pid=580 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
49 Dewan, supra note 1.
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consideration for traditional lenders, especially commercial banks,
and possibly even retail banks. These lenders look to be those
contributing to the data accounted for by the SBLI. Microenterprises
continue to be an afterthought to banks, and part of ARRA intended
to close this gap accordingly.
C. Protecting Borrowers
While most MFIs fall outside of the formal statutory regime
governing banks and other for-profit (including "predatory")
lenders, these regulations in the United States are a starting point in
evaluating effective frameworks for microfinance activities. The
problem is categorizing MFIs. Commercial bank investments in
CDFIs fall under the term, as do a myriad of tax-exempt nonprofit
institutions. The infant sector of independent (from commercial
banks) for-profit MFIs is also to be considered. This section will
discuss both the statutory and regulatory controls that have been
placed on banks and other financial institutions. If MFIs continue to
expand as they have, there should either be reforms treating them as
distinct classes of organizations, or changes to allow more clarity and
safety under the current structure of bureaucratic oversight.
The recent financial crisis forced the world, and especially the
United States, to evaluate shortcomings in the regulatory
environment. To address them, the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, or Dodd-Frank Act, reconsidered the past
few decades' trend of deregulation, and addressed both ends of the
wealth spectrum in the United States.50 Especially considering the
criticized GLBA expansion of authorized bank activities,51 it tackled
dormant problems in the powerful, interconnected banking and
financial services industries. Included among legislative concerns
was the inadequacy of loan regulations, something crucial to
microfinance if it wishes to progress. Former head of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Elizabeth Warren, asked why
financial products (specifically mortgages) that "catch fire" causing
50 Anita Bernstein, The Trouble with Regulating Microfinance, 35 HAWAII L. REV. 1,
20 (2013).
5 See Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the
Financial Mess, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2009),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 12366502 3774979341.
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financial ruin one out of twenty times are allowed to be sold whereas
toasters that only do so one out of a hundred times are not.5 2
Microcredit should be subject to at least some "safety" measures and
precautions especially because it targets such a financially vulnerable
demographic.
1. Interest Rates and Abuses
Microfinance, although much less controversial, involves
issues related to payday and fringe lending.53 Considering the
significant overlap in the targeted low- to moderate-income
population, existing experiences in regulation of this field could assist
to find a reasonable way to protect borrowers. In the 1900s, wage
assignments were used to secure payday loans, entitling the lender to
collect payment due from the payroll office of the borrower's
employer.5 4 Today, a typical situation in a payday loan is where the
consumer writes a $300 check payable in two weeks (postdated) and
in return receives $255 in cash at the time he or she needs it.5 As its
fee, the lender retains the remaining $45.
Early on, upon the realization that dissatisfaction with low
usury caps drove a substantial amount of lending activity to loan
sharks, the model Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) was drafted in
1916 as the brainchild of the Russell Sage Foundation.56 The law was
the result of an effort by regulators, consumer advocates, and lenders
to facilitate "small-loan lending at the lowest practicably profitable
52 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (2008) (asking why consumers are "protected from dangerous products and
sharp business practices when they purchase tangible consumer products, but left at
the mercy of their creditors when they sign up for routine financial products like
mortgages and credit cards").
53 See Alan M. White, Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons from Microcredit in
Developing Nations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1093, 1096 (2012).
54 Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 807 (2012).
See, e.g., Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 169
(2007) ("Thus, a typical example [of a payday loan] would be that in exchange for a
$300 advance until the next payday, the borrower writes a postdated check for $300
and receives $255 in cash-the lender taking a $45 fee off the top.").
56 See ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN SHARK, 73-74 (2010)
(discussing the drafting efforts that resulted in the USLL).
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rates by licensed and transparent lenders."5 7 The USLL was adopted
in three-quarters of the states in various forms by the 1950s.5 8 Some
states in the 1930s attempted to reduce the ceiling, only to experience
the return of illegal loan sharking.59 These laws would have the most
teeth in cases where banks, bank subsidiaries, "affiliates," and other
large for-profit entities issue microloans through CDFIs.
At the state level, usury laws force interest rate caps.
However, payday lenders have developed tactics to sustain high
interest rates. Early lenders took the position that state usury laws
did not apply to them because their loans were not loans per se and
borrowers were incurring fees rather than interest.60 In light of
federal law, more modern maneuvers to charge interest over state
caps have included affiliations with out-of-state banks.61 These
affiliations took advantage of the National Bank Act's provision
allowing nationally chartered banks to charge "interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State ... where the bank is located,"62 and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act's allowance of the same for state-
chartered banks.63 However, in 2005, the FDIC promulgated
regulations to counter these affiliations through increased capital
requirements and added scrutiny for banks and thrifts affiliated with
payday lenders.
Finally, laws including the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act) and the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) address
collections practices on the ground. The FTC Act created the Federal
Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Financial Services for Low & Middle Income
Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 729, 749 (2012) (discussing the problems
faced by low and middle income communities with financial services and credit
products, and where an overly paternalistic regulatory approach might come up
short).
5s Mayer, supra note 54, at 822.
See Rolf Nugent, Three Experiments in Small-Loan Interest Rates, 11 HARv. Bus.
REv. 35, 37-46 (1933) (describing effects of state decisions lowering maximum
interest rates for small-loans, in 1929 and through the 1930s).
60 See Jean Ann Fox, Unsafe and Unsound: Payday Lenders Hide Behind FDIC
Bank Charters to Peddle Usury, CONSUMERS FED'N OF AM. 7 (Mar. 30, 2004),
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/pdlrentabankreport.pdf ("Early payday lenders used
inventive schemes to hide the true nature of their loans.").
61 Id.
62 See National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2013).
63 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831aa (2013).
20 14 27 1
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Trade Commission (FTC).64 In relevant part, the FTC Act grants the
FTC commissioner general authority to hear and seek redress for
consumer grievances for alleged incidents of "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce,"65 It also allows the FTC
commissioner to promulgate rules, especially in "defin[ing] with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive . . . ."66
Primarily in the mortgage context, one of the CCPA's central
provisions requires calculation of "finance charges . . . as the sum of
all charges payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor
as an incident to the extension of credit."67 But the calculation
excludes "charges of a type payable in a comparable cash
transaction," and in the mortgage context, those "imposed by third
party closing agents."68
2. Transparency
To facilitate positive economic impact, ensure debtor
repayment, and prevent the overextension of credit, regulation of
microfinance should take transparency needs into account. In
addition to the usury concerns addressed above, credit contracts have
been widely criticized throughout the twentieth century for being
ambiguous.69 The post-World War II explosion in widespread
consumer credit use exposed serious deficiencies in consumers'
understanding of these contracts.70 Varying methods of computing
interest and the complexity of quoted credit prices were primarily to
blame, especially with the growth of the consumer borrowing
population.7 1 Furthermore, statutory terms and classifications
64 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2013).
65 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2013).
66 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2013).
67 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2013).
68 Id.
69 Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit:





defined by state governments in regulating consumer credit lacked
consistency.72
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), part of the CCPA, sought
economic stabilization and strengthening of competition among
various lenders."73 It requires a standard Annual Percentage Rate
(APR) calculation for consumer loans,74 as well as a "single,
integrated disclosure for mortgage loan transactions."75 In doing so,
as the House Committee on Banking and Currency reported (to the
proposed legislation), "the American consumer will be given the
information he needs to compare the cost of credit and to make the
best informed decision on the use of credit."7 6
Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board
under color of TILA's statutory delegation, implements the statute,
providing it with specificity.77 Regulation Z defines a "finance
charge" as the "cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount."78
Finance charges include a substantial ist of interest, premiums, fees,
and various other charges.79 It then goes further to define
circumstances in which disclosures outlined in § 128 of TILA apply to
extensions of credit, specifically that such disclosures are necessary
whenever "a finance charge may be imposed or which pursuant to an
agreement, is or may be payable in more than four installments."80
The scope of Regulation Z was contested in Mourning v.
Family Publications Svc., Inc., but the Supreme Court held that the rule
was a valid exercise of the Federal Reserve Board's rulemaking
authority under TILA.81 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
noted Congress's policy transition "from a philosophy of '[1]et the
buyer beware' to one of '[1]et the seller disclose."'82 In July 2011,
following the passage of Dodd-Frank, general rulemaking authority
under TILA was transferred from the Board of Governors of the
72 Id.
73 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2013).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (2013).
15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2013).
76 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, at 10-13 (1967).
12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2014).
78 12 C.F.R. § 1026.4(a) (2014).
12 C.F.R. § 1026.4(b) (2014).
80 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2014).
81 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
82 Id.
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Federal Reserve System to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.83
D. Banking Regulation
While many countries have explicit regulation for the
microfinance sector,8 4 laws in the United States largely omit similar
specific treatment. In short, exposure to U.S. law depends heavily on
how an MFI is categorized. One suggestion is to divide them between
mutual-aid, nonprofit, and for-profit institutions.85 Another looks to
further divide nonprofit institutions into those primarily distributing
federal funds (mostly CDFIs) and those operating independently
from the government.86
MFI activities in issuing loans and providing checking and
savings accounts seem to align MFIs with banks, especially if the
institution in question is for-profit. To clarify, this section focuses on
smaller institutions that begin as mutual-aid or nonprofit and at some
point transition to for-profit, rather than banks involved in small-
dollar lending as part of the statutory "encouragement" discussed in
Part III.A. On a global basis, there has been a trend toward MFIs
licensed as banks or specialized finance companies.87 These MFIs are
able to access capital markets, take deposits from institutional
investors, and participate in other commercial financing
83 Press Release, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Feb. 1,
2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110201a.htm.
84 Ian Davis, Rural Banking: Designing an Effective Legal Framework for
Microfinance, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 394 (2008-2009); See generally
Alfredo Ebentreich, Microfinance Regulation in Peru: Current State, Lessons
Learned and Prospects for the Future, 4 ESSAYS ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
1, 1 (IRIS Center, University of Maryland, Apr. 2005) (discussing the different
categories of MFIs in Peru and how they "are regulated with the same norms as
banking and other financial institutions" but are subject to different capital
requirements and restrictions on activities).
as Bernstein, supra note 50, at 25.
86 Olivia L. Walker, Note, The Future ofMicrolending in the United States: A Shift
from Charity to Profits?, 6 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 383, 387 (2011).
Elizabeth Littlefield & Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance and the Poor: Breaking
Down the Walls Between Microfinance and the Formal Financial System, 39 FIN. &




arrangements typically beyond the reach of nonprofits.88 This,
proponents argue, is how microfinance can really have an impact, by
"becom[ing] a fully integrated party of a developing country's
mainstream financial system."89 But with the current state of credit in
the United States, this statement should not be confined to
"developing countries."
This section will focus on the possible scope of banking law in
the United States as it relates to for-profit MFIs and how U.S. law
might consider such entities. The most similar (to banks) of this
group would theoretically be subject to the gamut of federal banking
regulation, including registration, licensing, capital adequacy, and
prudential requirements. Some suggest that most MFIs are too small
to involve systemic risk and hence do not require much if any
regulation.90 Others suggest that regulating these smaller, banking-
related institutions "may be impracticable because proportionately
more regulatory resources and costs are required to regulate them"
and that private peer supervision might be more effective
considering their "small size and community focus."91
1. Federal Oversight of Banks
The Federal Depository Insurance Act of 1950 defines a bank
as "any national bank and State bank, and any Federal branch and
insured branch; and . . . includes any former savings association."
State banks under the Act are "any banking association, trust
company, savings bank, industrial bank . . . or other depository
institution which . . . receiv[es] deposits, other than trust funds ...
and is incorporated under the laws of any State . . ."92 The Act goes
on to include in its definition of savings associations "any
corporation (other than a bank) that the Board of Directors and the
Comptroller of the Currency jointly determine to be operating in
88Id.
Id. at 39.
90 See Robert Peck Christen, et al., Microfinance Consensus Guidelines: Guiding
Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance, CONSULTATIVE GROUP
To ASSIST THE POOR/THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 15 (2003).
91 See Jones, supra note 15, at 201.
92 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2013).
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substantially the same manner as a savings association."9 3 It appears
that at least some for-profit MFIs could at least be determined to be
"operating in substantially the same manner as a savings
association."94 With a more functional definition, the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 includes "[a]n institution organized under the
laws of the United States, [or] any State ... which both accepts [sic]
demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by
check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and ...
is engaged in the business of making commercial loans."95 Again,
MFIs accepting deposits and making loans would fit. Many small
loans might not be thought of as a commercial loan product,
especially with the prevalent use of payday loans for personal
expenses.96 However, MFIs could easily condition loans on use for
"entrepreneurial" purposes. "Commercial loan" is left undefined by
the Act and the usual, though broad, understanding of this term is
the business equivalent to consumer credit.97 Regardless of this,
many MFIs merely involve compulsory contributions to deposit or
savings accounts elsewhere (at other institutions, usually banks) as a
precondition to extensions of credit,98 which might take such MFIs
outside of the first requirement of the BHCA.
It is important to note that for better or for worse, many of the
statutory terms governing banking, savings and loan, and financial
institutions, as well as associated holding companies leave
considerable room for regulatory interpretation. In 1986, the Supreme
Court held in FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. that the FDIC's
interpretation of the FDIA's scope of what a "deposit" was, even
without implementing regulation, entitled to the "considerable
weight [that] should be accorded to an executive department's
93 Id.
94 See id.
12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2013).
96 See generally Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 613 (2012).
Commercial Loan, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commercial-loan.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
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construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."99 A
decade later, the Court similarly held that the Comptroller of the
Currency's interpretation of the "business of banking" term's scope is
subject to Chevron deference, as long as the Comptroller's discretion
is exercised within "reasonable bounds."10 0 In the event that the
propriety of regulating MFIs became an issue in litigation, the Court
under Chevron would likely defer to the agency's interpretation
absent extraordinary circumstances of the agency acting outside the
constraints of its organic statute.101 It is easy to see that regulating at
least some MFIs would be consistent with congressional intent.
The FDIA was enacted in 1950, and the BHCA in 1956.
Without a lengthy discussion of other federal banking statutes,
decades-old statutes as such seem to already lay the legislative
groundwork for MFI regulation, whether full-fledged rulemaking is
conducted or agency practice simply changes. The authority exists,
but the question is whether agency initiative does. In light of the
recent troubles with banks and financial institutions, maybe there is
initiative for oversight. Especially considering the Basel Committee's
recent focus on deposit-taking institutions as related to microfinance
activities, there is the added issue of what regulations are necessary
in the event that individuals do, and continue to, deposit significant
amounts of their earnings in MFIs. Many MFIs in the United States
currently suggest partner banks or other depository institutions for
borrowers to make checking or savings deposits. But some MFIs
could choose to accept deposits themselves. They might be
encouraged to do so for funds once initial donor investment money is
spent and further growth is desired. In particular, those operating for
profit and falling under the usual bank regulatory regimes are likely
to be subject to more requirements. Some have argued that it is most
appropriate for them to be supervised by whatever regulator
supervises commercial banks, requiring specialized staff since both
the risk characteristics of MFI loans and the supervisory techniques
476 U.S. 426 (1986).
100 NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-
259 (1995).
101 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984) (holding that legislative silence or ambiguity on an issue allows an
agency's treatment of such issue if it is based on a permissible reading of the
statute).
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most suited to MFIs differ from those involved with commercial
banks.102
IV. STRATEGIES TO IMPLEMENT
In order to consider possible solutions for ensuring the
expansion of microfinance in the United States avoids the foregoing
problems, it is worth examining how various players at the
international level have addressed the issues of borrower protection
and financial regulation. It may be that all the necessary parts of
rulemaking power are already in place to ensure microfinance's long-
term safety and viability, particularly to individual consumers, but
also as a potential part of financial markets.1 03
A. What Kind of Regulation?
Especially if the roots of MFIs in humanitarian aid are
ignored, the type of credit they extend seems in theory to resemble
the usurious payday loans and fringe products addressed in Part
III.C. Regulation should attempt to quell this concern. There might be
a range of parties with interests in the level and nature of regulation,
namely the government in defending the public interest, for-profit
institutions in encouraging investment (in what might be described
as pseudo-social enterprises) while avoiding government constraints,
and purely nonprofit organizations in presenting sustainability to
stakeholders.104
MFIs self-regulating through Self Regulatory Organizations
(SROs) should be considered. In this context, self-regulation involves
regulation by a body "effectively controlled by the regulated entities,
102 See Christen, supra note 90, at 27.
103 Safety and viability in the second context would be evaluated from the
perspective of securitizing MFI loans to be packaged and traded, which is beyond
the scope of this article. For an in-depth guide through the process, see
SECURITIZATION: A TECHNICAL GUIDE (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor/The
World Bank and Grameen Foundation USA 2010) available at
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Technical-Guide-Securitization-Oct-
2010.pdf.
104 Eugenia Macchiavello, Microfinance Regulation and Supervision: A Multi-Faced
Prism ofStructures, Levels and Issues, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 125 (2012-2013).
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and thus not effectively controlled by the government supervisor."10 5
The Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA) is an example,
but it is subject to the "active and direct oversight of the SEC."06 For
this reason, one author argues FINRA is technically not a government
entity, but should still be subject to administrative law and
constitutional restrictions.107 Regardless of how an SRO governing
MFIs is classified, the government would be less involved than with
direct agency oversight, but more involved than allowing regulation
through market forces.108 This might make it much more desirable
than creation of yet another regulatory agency or expanding of the
scope of a particular agency's oversight. The government would
encourage self-regulation through rules that "threaten costly
litigation should [the] industry fail to deliver socially desired
outcomes."109 As a result, MFIs might comply with the applicable
SRO's rules even if just to avoid government intervention.110 To the
consumer, a successful SRO would inspire confidence through the
related function of hearing and addressing consumer concerns.11 1 An
effective arrangement could involve the SRO enjoying immunity
from lawsuits, like securities industry SROs,112 to isolate it from
industry influence. At the same time, the SRO would provide
grievance redress, specifically for MFI borrowers.113
In developing countries, however, self-regulation has seen its
failure in maintaining the soundness of financial intermediaries,
leading critics to calling it a gamble.114 To some extent, self-regulation
105 See Christen, supra note 90, at 28 (emphasis added/repeated).
106 Karmel, supra note 40, at 152.
107 Id. at 155.
108 Abraham L. Newman & David Bach, Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow
of Public Power: Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the U.S., 17(3)
GOVERNANCE 387, 390 (2004) (discussing self-regulation of relatively "new" areas
such as e-commerce, and characterizing the U.S. model of self-regulation as
legalistic self-regulation).
109 Id. at 388.
110 Id.
n. Id. at 390.
112 See Karmel, supra note 40, at 173.
113 See Brigit Helms & David Porteous, Focus Note 27: Protecting Microfinance
Borrowers, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, 4 (May 2005), available at
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/fil es/CGAP-Focus-Note-Protecting-Microfinance-
Borrowers-May-2005.pdf.
114 See Christen et al., supra note 90, at 28.
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is nothing more than a meaningless political concession to no
regulation.115 Further criticism suggests that successful regulation
through an SRO depends on whether "the majority of institutions are
under its jurisdiction and if sanctions for non-compliance can be
enforced," conditions that are seldom met.116
Nevertheless, a regime of self-regulation might be an
inexpensive measure to precede full-scale regulatory involvement
and test its self-regulation's effectiveness. At the very least, it could
encourage reporting and articulation of "best practices."117 For
guidance on borrower protection, the Consultative Group to Assist
the Poor (CGAP) and organizations such as Accion have promoted a
campaign for Client Protection Principles ("CPPs") to address
avoidance of over-indebtedness, transparent pricing, appropriate
collection practices, ethical staff behavior, mechanisms for grievance
redress, and client data privacy.118As far as financial and prudential
regulations, the Basel Committee has done the same, as referenced in
Part II.119 International best practices are available from many
different sources and could be adopted by the applicable SRO,
making compliance a requirement for membership. Membership
would then act as a quality-screening device for prospective
borrowers.
B. The Dilemma of Capping MFI Interest Rates
Usury laws applied to MFIs present a complex problem. With
respect to for-profit lenders, regulators likely would not think twice
to apply them. But from the business perspective, high interest rates
are necessary. MFIs issue loans of small principal amounts. The loan
cycles for MFI loans, designed to help borrowers stay current and
avoid substantial individual payments, are shorter than those of
traditional commercial loans, usually at six months to a year with
some amount due every week.120 Because this means more collection
activities and transactions for a given account, overall costs are
115 Id.
116 Greuning et al., supra note 98, at 16.
117 Id.
118 Macchiavello, supra note 104, at 170.
119 Basel, supra note 16.
120 Davis, supra note 84, at 417.
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substantially higher than those for traditional portfolios of fewer but
larger (and longer-term) loans.121 Many MFIs are forced to charge
"obscene" interest rates, much higher than commercial bank rates
and outside of most regulators' comfort zones, to cover these costs
and remain financially sound.122 Without alternatives, poor
borrowers around the world have had little objection to these high
rates.123
On the one hand, countries with monopoly players
dominating their microcredit markets have been thought to achieve
better results with caps, because they increase market entry,
encouraging competition with established players and consequently
driving loan prices down.124 However, caps might fall short of
lawmakers' good intentions when considering the high
administrative costs previously discussed. For example, Bolivia caps
loan interest at three percent per month.125 By American standards,
the equivalent compounded maximum annual r te of 42.58 percent, if
charged, is criminally high. As a point of reference, Florida law,
which is already generous among its peers, declares usurious annual
rates higher than eighteen percent for loans under $500,000.126 For
loans over $500,000, it is a second-degree misdemeanor for a lender
to charge annual rates between twenty-five and forty-five percent
and a third-degree felony to charge more than forty-five percent.127
As generous as the Bolivian cap is, it could fail as a consumer
protection device if the rates charged are still too harsh for borrowers
and if MFIs are unable to operate efficiently. Where pre-determined
rates are imposed on lenders they usually prevent lenders from
covering their costs, barring them from "operat[ing] efficiently and
competitively."1 2 8 If enough sanctioned MFIs withdraw in a certain
market, borrowers would be forced to rely on informal lenders due to
121 Id. at 416.
1 22 Id. at 417.
123 Id.
124 Bernstein, supra note 50, at 22.
125 Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria De La Pefia, Legal and Regulatory Requirements
For Effective Rural Financial Markets, CTR. FOR THE ECON. ANALYSIS OF LAW, 27
(2003).
126 FLA. STAT. § 687.02(1) (2014)
127 FLA. STAT. § 687.071(2), (3) (2014)
128 See Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial
Perspective, WORLD BANK 18 (1999).
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the reduction in regulated lenders.129 In addition to usurious rates,
the use of abusive collections tactics might manifest as a problem. In
theory, it could be a matter of laws allowing different rates for
different financial subsectors. Such a policy is found in South Africa,
where legislation authorizes the Minister of Trade and Finance to set
rates based on market data and in consultation with the National
Credit Regulators, an independent body of economic experts.130
Regulation in the United States could seek to adjust rates or rate caps
on a more specific basis to balance the burden on borrowers and the
financial viability of MFIs.
C. Consumer Protection: Abuses and Transparency
Regardless of the type or amount of regulation imposed on
MFIs, much of it will fail without some degree of fairness to
borrowers. Regulations should prevent coercion and confusion. For a
new regulatory body, policies and data could be borrowed from the
CFPB's playbook on credit products, or CGAP guidelines.131
Microloan terms should be barred from containing the "tricks and
traps" of credit card (or mortgage) terms.132 The full range of an
MFI's loan offerings should be marketed as "vanilla" or standardized
products without provisions like balloon payments.133
Best practices or regulation should also take a paternalistic
stance against exploitative practices. Some scholars have explored
how welfare effects of consumer credit are skewed by lender
manipulation of consumer preferences.134 These scholars suggest that
lenders exploit borrower optimism and insufficient reasoning.135 The
lenders leverage this behavior to persuade borrowers to "enter credit
transactions that reduce their consumption in the present and future,
129 See id.; see also Heywood & De La Pefia, supra note 125.
130 Megan Whittaker, South Africa's National Credit Act: A Possible Model for the
Proper Role of Interest Rate Ceilings for Microfinance, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
561, 573 (2008) (discussing South Africa's arguably successful implementation of
rate ceilings).
131 See Helms & Porteous, supra note 113, at 4.
132 Mann, supra note 57, at 735.
133 Id. (different scholars' approaches to the best types and terms for mortgages)




do not result in investment or other gains, and simply transfer their
limited resources to lenders and investors."136
Standardized loans go hand in hand with standardized terms,
particularly statements of cost. Loans made by different types of
lenders routinely state the cost of the loan according to different
standards. For example "[a]nnual percentage rate and total cost of
credit count the cost of borrowing differently and are used among
other calculations."137 The gap between the requisite literacy to fully
understand financial products and actual borrower literacy138 is a
problem that can be addressed uniform and easily understood
standards. Select CCPA and TILA provisions should be applied to
microloans, especially those mandating the standard APR
calculation, the disclosure of the appropriate "finance charge" and
uniformity of disclosure.139 In addition, notwithstanding how high or
low rates are set at a certain time of underwriting, payments by
borrowers should be fully amortizing and interest rates should be
fixed.140 This would lead to less of the surprises endured by
consumers in the mortgage crisis, with loans transforming from low
(teaser) rate opportunities into "explosive" subprime financial
products.141
Another lesson from the crisis is the undesirability of
individual borrowers with multiple loans outstanding.142 Borrowers
with multiple loans, or loans in frequent succession, are a criticism
levied against payday lenders as potentially "ensnar[ing] consumers
in a debt trap."143 MFIs should therefore be barred from issuing
multiple concurrent loans to individual borrowers, and a mechanism
should be implemented to limit an individual borrower's ability to
obtain loans from different lenders. Rules, as either a supplement or
an alternative, could cap the amount of debt relative to a borrower's
income and incorporate penalties as appropriate for exceeding the
136 Id.; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 52, at 46.
137 Bernstein, supra note 50, at 21.
138 Id
139 See section III.C.2 infra for a discussion of the Truth in Lending Act.
140 Mann, supra note 57, at 734.
141 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 52, at 10.
142 Bernstein, supra note 50, at 23.
143 Hynes, supra note 96, at 615-16.
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cap.144 Specific guidance to address some of these issues is available
to regulators and to the MFI industry in model principles such as the
CPPs discussed above.145
V. CONCLUSION
The potential for small loans to have a positive impact on
credit access in the United States seems to be undermined by this lack
of legal certainty. Nonprofit institutions in the United States are
organized in ways that escape the brunt of regulation and so are their
products. However, the foray of MFIs around the world into for-
profit operations suggests that U.S. based organizations are not far
behind. As they move into the role of an alternate source of financing,
these lenders' missions would benefit greatly if new laws could
address safety both on the consumer and institutional levels.
Increasing access to credit is meaningless if reforms are not
proactively implemented to address the problems previously
experienced with predatory and payday lending. While the purposes
of microcredit might stymy some of these concerns, continuing to
treat microfinance as an exception to rules seems contrary to policies
that purport to put consumers first. A legal and regulatory
framework for this field must exist beyond carving out exceptions.
Finally, such a framework should reflect commitments to the
consumer and serve to promote efficiency and safety rather than
acting as a burden on the industry.
144 Helms & Porteous, supra note 113, at 3.
145 Macchiavello, supra note 104, at 170.
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